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ABSTRACT. This research utilized longitudinal 
and cross-sectional methods to investigate the 
relation between the development of a 
representational theory of mind and children's 
growing ability to search their own minds for 
appropriate problem solutions. In the first 
experiment, 59 preschool children were given 3 
false-belief tasks and a divergent-thinking task. 
Those children who passed false-belief tasks 
produced significantly more items, as well as more 
original items, in response to divergent-thinking 
questions than those children who failed. This 
significant association persisted even when 
chronological age and verbal and nonverbal 
general ability were partialed out. In a second 
study, 20 children who failed the false-belief tasks 
in the first experiment were retested 3 months later. 
Again, those who now passed the false-belief tasks 
were significantly better at the divergent-thinking 
task than those who continued to fail. The 
associations between measures of divergent 
thinking and understanding false beliefs remained 
significant when controlling for the covariates. 
Earlier divergent-thinking scores did not predict 
false-belief understanding three months later. In-
stead, children who passed false-belief tasks on the 
second measure improved significantly in relation 
to their own earlier performance and improved 
significantly more than children who continued to 
fail. False-belief task performance was 
significantly correlated to the amount of 
intraindividual improvement in divergent thinking 
even when age and verbal and nonverbal skills 
were partialed out. These findings suggest that 
developments in common underlying skills are 
responsible for the improvement in understanding 
other minds and searching one's own. Changes in 
representational and executive skills are discussed 
as potential causes of the improvement. 
 
 
Much research has recently been devoted to the 
study of the development of a representational 
theory of mind. By about age 4 most children 
understand that people, including they themselves, 
may misrepresent the world (e.g., Flavell, Flavell, 
& Green, 1983; Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Moore, 
Pure, & Furrow, 1990; Perrier, Leekam, & 
Wimmer, 1987; Wimmer & Perrier, 1983). This 
understanding of false belief is evidence for a 
representational theory of mind, because it implies 
an understanding that mental states are attitudes to 
representations of the world, rather than attitudes to 
direct copies of reality (Dennett, 1978; Wimmer & 
Perrier, 1983). Although some research suggests 
that even 3-year-old children may be able to pass 
simpler versions of classic theory-of-mind tasks 
(Chandler & Hala, 1994; Saltmarsh, Mitchell, & 
Robinson, 1995; Sullivan & Winner, 1993) and 
may have an implicit understanding of belief 
(Clements & Perrier, 1994, 1997), many 
researchers maintain the traditional view that 
fundamental cognitive changes are responsible for 
4-year-olds' understanding of false beliefs (e.g., 
Flavell, 1993; Olson, 1993; Perner, 1995). 
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Two areas of potential improvement have been 
proposed to underlie 4-year-olds' ability to pass 
standard theory-of-mind tasks: representational and 
executive skills. Measures of a representational 
theory of mind (such as false-belief tasks) typically 
require children to simultaneously entertain various 
conflicting representations (e.g., what it looks like 
and what it really is; your belief and my belief) of 
the same object or event (e.g., Flavell, 1993). Some 
researchers have suggested that through 
metarepresentation, or the ability to represent 
representational relations, children become able to 
tag different representations (as "false" or "true"; 
your belief and my belief) and thus avoid 
paradoxical conflict between the representations 
(Olson, 1993; Perrier, 1991; Suddendorf, 1999). 
There is some evidence suggesting that this new 
representational capacity also helps children in rule 
use (e.g., Frye, Zelazo, and Palfai, 1995). The tasks 
may, however, also be interpreted as testing ex-
ecutive functions. They require the child to engage 
and disengage various rules or representations. 
Failure to disengage from one's own present 
representation (e.g., belief, appearance, rule) to 
assume another might explain the typical 
perseveration of younger children (e.g., Russel, 
Jarrold, & Potel, 1994). Representational and 
executive accounts may not be in conflict, 
however. Indeed, Suddendorf (1999) proposed that 
the development of representational and executive 
factors converge at around age 4, enabling the child 
to improve on a host of skills the author subsumes 
under the heading metamind. If it is correct that 
skills such as metarepresentation and executive 
control underlie children's ability to pass standard 
theory-of- mind tasks, then one would expect that 
other capacities are also affected by the 
development of these skills and that the other 
capacities improve in tandem with false-belief 
understanding. 
One of the other skills that might benefit from 
these representational and executive gains is 
divergent thinking. Divergent thinking, or the 
generation of many ideas or potential problem 
solutions, is a fundamental human cognitive skill 
(cf. Runco, 1992). From an early age children are 
confronted with problems that require novel 
solutions. Adults actively encourage children to 
make connections between previously independent 
aspects of knowledge, pointing out relation 
between different aspects of reality. Shared 
features of objects or events are emphasized in 
educational toys and teacher-child conversations. 
This helps children to structure their semantic 
networks flexibly, providing the basis for the 
generation of novel problem solutions. Children's 
ability to search their own minds for appropriate 
ideas might benefit from the emergence of skills 
that enable them to assume the different mental 
states others might hold (i.e., false-belief 
understanding). In divergent thinking, the same 
object or event might be represented in various 
different ways (e.g., Function A, B, and C), and 
potential problem solutions might be tagged as 
"right" and "wrong." The generation of creative 
problem solutions might further benefit from the 
ability to disengage from immediate perception 
and close associations in order to assume more 
novel ideas. In sum, the generation of many 
creative ideas and assessment of whether they fit 
the problem criteria might be facilitated by the 
ability to disengage from current mental content 
and by metarepresentational reflection. 
Suddendorf and Fletcher-Flinn (1997) recently 
found some preliminary support for this 
hypothesis. They gave children false-belief (Prior, 
Dahlstrom, & Squires, 1990) and divergent-
thinking tasks (Ward, 1968). In contrast to the 
convergent thinking questions of conventional 
intelligence tests, tests of divergent thinking (e.g., 
Guilford, 1968; Torrance, 1974; Wallach & 
Kogan, 1965; see Runco, 1992, for a review) 
involve open-ended questions such as "Tell me all 
the things you can think of that are round," or "Tell 
me all the ways in which you can use a newspa-
per." This results in scores for fluency, or the 
number of appropriate ideas, and for uniqueness, 
or the number of novel ideas. Analysis of 
children's performance revealed a significant 
correlation between false-belief task performance 
and both fluency (r = .62) and uniqueness (r = .48) 
of responses in the divergent-thinking task. Those 
children who passed false-belief tasks produced 
significantly more items, as well as more original 
items, than children who failed. Thus, Suddendorf 
and Fletcher-Flinn (1997) took the results as 
support for their hypothesis that common cognitive 
processes are involved in the acquisition of a 
representational theory of mind and divergent 
thinking. In particular, it was suggested that the 
abilities to disengage and metarepresent might al-
low children to entertain false beliefs as well as ac-
tively search their own minds by scanning and 
assessing their knowledge base for appropriate 
problem solutions. 
Although the findings are consistent with such 
an interpretation, there are various problems with 
correlational results. Earlier false-belief 
understanding has recently been found to be 
significantly correlated with various factors, 
including number of siblings (Jenkins & Astington, 
1996; Perner, Ruffinan, & Leekam, 1994), 
language ability (Jenkins & Astington, 1996; 
Suddendorf & Fletcher-Flinn, 1997), metalinguistic 
skills (Fletcher-Flinn & Snelson, 1997), computer 
use (Fletcher-Flinn & Suddendorf, 1996, 1997), 
attachment security (Fonagy, Redfern, & Charman, 
1997), imaginary object pantomime (Suddendorf & 
Fletcher-Flinn, 1996; Suddendorf, Fletcher-Flinn, 
& Johnston, 1999; M. Taylor & Carlson, 1997), 
working memory (Davis & Pratt, 1995; Keenan, 
Olson, & Marini, in press), and social competence 
(Lalonde & Chandler, 1995). Although it might be 
a sign of progress that, after more than a decade of 
extensive research into the typical development of 
theory of mind in children, investigators are 
beginning to explore individual differences 
(Bartsch & Estes, 1996), it is not entirely clear 
what to make of cross-sectional correlations. 
First of all, correlational findings might merely 
be artifacts. It is to be expected that some variables 
will be found to be significantly associated merely 
by chance, especially in studies with large numbers 
of variables. It is also problematic that some 
studies, including Suddendorf and Fletcher-Finn's 
(1997), use a single type of false-belief task. Given 
the low to moderate test-retest reliability of such 
tests (Mayes, Klin, Tercyak, Cicchetti, & Cohn, 
1996), caution seems warranted. It is therefore 
necessary to replicate the findings and employ a 
variety of different measures of false-belief 
understanding. 
Secondly, even when cross-sectional 
correlations are replicated, it is not clear whether 
there is a causal connection between the variables 
or whether unspecified maturational variables 
might mediate the association. To combat this 
problem, most research controls for the 
contribution of general factors such as chrono-
logical and mental age. Suddendorf and Fletcher-
Flinn (1997) found that the correlation between 
divergent thinking and false-belief task 
performance survived partialling out of 
chronological age and verbal mental age measured 
using the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS; 
L. M. Dunn, Dunn, Whetton, & Pintilie, 1982). 
However, there might always be some other, 
theoretically not specified, factor mediating the ob-
served correlation. In this case nonverbal 
intelligence would be a prime candidate. 
Finally, even when an association turns out to 
be reliable and robust, it does not inform us about 
the direction of the relation. There are theoretical 
grounds for assuming that some correlates 
contribute to earlier understanding of false beliefs 
and others are consequences of the developed false-
belief understanding or depend on the same 
underlying capacities as a representational theory 
of mind. Clearly, passing false belief tasks cannot 
be responsible for the number of siblings or the use 
of a computer. If there is a causal relation, the 
direction must be that exposure to siblings or 
computers contributes to earlier false-belief under-
standing. In the case of divergent thinking, 
however, this is not so clear. Although Suddendorf 
and Fletcher-Flinn (1997) claim that 
representational and executive skills are 
responsible for passing false-belief tasks and also 
promote divergent-thinking skills, this need not be 
the case. Perhaps children with greater skills at 
divergent thinking pass false-belief tasks earlier. 
Some support for this alternative interpretation can 
be found in the literature. 
Divergent thinking might be regarded as an 
aspect of imagination and fantasy skill (cf., 
Dansky, 1980; Johnson, 1976), and several 
researchers have made a case for growing 
imaginative powers leading up to false-belief 
understanding (e.g., Harris, 1991; M. Taylor & 
Carlson, 1997). Children with greater imagination 
may pass false-belief tasks earlier. This appears to 
be true, for example, in children with imaginary 
friends (Lalonde & Chandler, 1995). Pretend play 
is an aspect of children's imagination that has 
received a lot of attention in theory-of-mind re-
search (e.g., Leslie, 1987; Lillard, 1993), and it has 
been argued that pretend play might promote 
earlier false-belief understanding (e.g., Perrier et 
al., 1994). Indeed, Dockett (1994, as cited in M. 
Taylor & Carison, 1997) found that children who 
were trained in pretend play scored better on 
theory-of-mind tasks than a control group. Thus, it 
might be that divergent thinking, like pretend play 
and fantasy, reflects the development of 
imaginational power that fosters earlier theory-of-
mind development. The imaginational power 
hypothesis might suggest that higher divergent-
thinking scores predict an earlier acquisition of a 
representational theory of mind, rather than being 
the result of the facilitating effect of the skills that 
may underlie theory of mind. 
To assess this possibility, longitudinal 
investigations might be more telling than cross-
sectional approaches. J. Dunn, Brown, 
Slomkowski, Tesla, and Youngblade (1991), for 
example; reported that social interaction and 
discourse predicted false-belief understanding 7 
months later. Analysis of intraindividual changes 
over time might be the best way to assess whether 
divergent thinking is a predictor of false-belief 
understanding or whether divergent thinking 
improves with the development of false-belief un-
derstanding. The research described herein utilized 
this approach. We attempted to gain further insight 
into the relation between false-belief task 
performance and divergent thinking, keeping in 
mind the problems just identified. 
 
 
Study 1 
 
In Study 1 we attempted to replicate 
Suddendorf and Fletcher-Flinn's (1997) finding 
with a larger sample. To reduce the chance of some 
general mediating factor being responsible for any 
observed association, a nonverbal test of general 
ability (the Geometric Design of the Wechsler 
Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence 
Revised [WPPSI-R]; Wechsler, 1989) was 
included, in addition to the BPVS. Controlling for 
chronological age and verbal and nonverbal 
intelligence covers the most likely mediating 
variables. The study also employed three quite 
different false-belief tasks to improve the reliability 
and generality of the measure. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
Fifty-nine children (28 girls and 31 boys) with a 
mean age of 4 years-1 month (4-1; range = 32 to 60 
months) participated. The sample was part of a 
broader study on computers and preschoolers. The 
children were recruited from three play centers on 
Waiheke Island, New Zealand, and the majority 
were of middle socioeconomic status. Consent of 
parents, staff, and the children themselves was 
obtained prior to testing. 
 
Apparatus 
 
Two 28 cm soft dolls (one with blond and one 
with black hair), a 10 x 6 x 3 cm tin with lid, a 10 x 
5 X 3 cm doll backpack, and a marble were used 
for the first false-belief task. A 20 x 10 x 10 cm toy 
police car carton containing a blue balloon was 
used for the second false-belief test. The third task 
was based on a watercolor painting. The BPVS (L. 
M. Dunn et al., 1982) and the WPPSI-R (Wechsler, 
1989) testing material was administered according 
to the manual. 
 
 
Procedure 
Testing took place in a quiet room in the 
participating play centers. The experimenter had 
been trained to conduct the testing but was 
deliberately kept blind as to the hypotheses that 
were being investigated. Children were tested 
individually, and the order of the tests was 
randomized. 
False-belief tasks. The first false-belief 
task was administered following Prior et al.'s 1990 
version of Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith's (1985) 
"Sally-Anne" task. Two dolls, Sally and Anne, 
were introduced to the children and, when their 
names were learned, the following story was told: 
Sally has a marble and she puts it into her 
basket and closes the lid. She says good-bye 
and goes out to play. Now `naughty Anne' 
takes the marble out of the basket and 
places it into the box and closes both lids. 
The child is then asked a memory question and a 
reality question: "Where did Sally put the marble, 
and where is the marble now?" (In the exceptional 
case of a child failing on the memory or reality 
question, the child was reminded of the true 
situation and the procedure was repeated.) The 
false-belief question followed: "When Sally comes 
back where will she look first for her marble?" The 
use of the word first has been suggested by Siegal 
and Beattie (1991) to make the task easier to 
comprehend. 
The other two false-belief tasks were based on 
belief predictions (Hogrefe, Wimmer, & Perner, 
1986; Perner et al., 1987). In the first test the child 
was presented with a box with pictures of a police 
car on it. When asked what might be in the box, 
children reliably replied "car" or pointed to the car 
picture. Then the box was opened and the true 
content revealed: a balloon. The balloon was put 
back into the box and the closed box was taken out 
of the child's reach. The false-belief question was 
asked next: "X (name of a same-sex playmate) 
hasn't seen inside this box. What will he (she) think 
is inside it before he (she) opens it?" 
Finally, in the second belief-prediction task, the 
child was shown a colorful painting of an 
underwater scene. In the center of the picture was a 
big patch of sea grass that concealed the front half 
of a mermaid so that only the fin remained visible. 
Asked what they thought might be behind the sea 
grass, most children asserted a big fish or a shark. 
The sea grass part of the painting could be lifted up 
so that the mermaid was revealed. Again, most 
children spontaneously labelled the creature a 
mermaid or a fish lady. Then the mermaid was 
concealed again and the false-belief question was 
asked: "X hasn't turned the page. What will she 
(he) think is behind the seaweed before she (he) 
turns the page?" 
Divergent-thinking test. Following 
Wallach and Kogan (1965) and Ward (1968), 
children were asked two types of questions. First 
they were asked to declare all the ways in which 
they may use or play with a newspaper, then with 
a cup, and finally with a towel. This final item of 
the Uses subtask was introduced as a substitute 
for a coat hanger because of a low response rate 
in an earlier study (Suddendorf & Fletcher-Flinn, 
1997). The item "table knife" was eliminated 
because being taught not to play with knives 
might inhibit children's responses. In the 
Instances subtask, the children were asked to 
declare all the things that they could think of that 
were round, that have wheels, and finally, that are 
red. The tests, as with the earlier ones, were 
introduced as games, and in a permissive 
atmosphere the children received moderate praise 
for performance. There was no time limit 
imposed on the children. Instead, the ex-
perimenter moved onto the next item when a 
child ran out of ideas and the experimenter had 
offered encouragement three times. 
Ability tests. The BPVS (Dunn et al., 
1982) is a measure of verbal intelligence based 
on vocabulary assessment. The test was 
introduced to the children as a picture-book 
game, and the normal procedures were followed. 
The Geometric Design subtest of the WPPSI-R 
(Wechsler, 1989) was chosen as a nonverbal 
measure of general ability. This test correlates r = 
.74 with IQ scores of the full test and thus gives a 
good estimate of general ability. The test was 
administered according to the manual. 
 
 
Scoring 
The false-belief tasks were scored individually 
as either 1 (passed) or 0 (failed). These scores were 
then used to create a composite measure of false-
belief understanding. Passing a minimum of two 
out of the three tasks was the criterion for 
categorization as understanding false beliefs. 
The divergent-thinking performance was first 
assessed by two independent raters who judged 
whether unique responses (i.e., responses given by 
only one child) were appropriate answers (e.g., 
"square" is an inappropriate answer to the question 
regarding things that are round). The remaining 
unique answers were then accumulated to form the 
uniqueness scores, and the total number of 
appropriate responses formed the overall fluency 
score. Brief preliminary analyses confirmed that 
there was no significant difference between Uses 
and Instances subtasks (cf. Suddendorf & Fletcher-
Flinn, 1997). Thus, the data were collapsed across 
the items of the Uses and Instances subtasks to 
form a total fluency score and a total uniqueness 
score. 
BPVS and Geometric Design raw scores were 
converted into verbal and nonverbal IQs to assess 
the children's general ability. For the correlational 
analysis, however, the test raw scores are 
relevant, because IQs confound the test 
performance with chronological age (which is 
considered separately). For reasons beyond the 
researchers' control, some participants were 
tested on the Geometric Design (21) and the 
BPVS (26) almost 3 months after all the other 
testing had taken place. Their raw scores were 
therefore expected to be enhanced. To reach a 
good estimate of these children's probable 
performance 3 months earlier, the scores needed 
to be adjusted. To maintain an IQ of 100, a child 
has to improve by a raw score of 3 points from 
age 4-0 to 4-3 on the BPV S. The raw scores of 
children tested with the 3-month delay were 
therefore adjusted by subtracting 3 points. 
Similarly, maintaining average intelligence in the 
Geometric Design with a 3 months' delay 
(between the ages of 3-6 to 4-6) requires an im-
provement of between 3 and 5 points. The raw 
scores were thus adjusted for the time delay by 
subtracting 4 points. However, we also analyzed 
the data using the unadjusted raw scores and the 
(age scaled) IQs. No significant changes to the 
overall findings were observed. To avoid 
redundancies, only the analysis with the ad-
justed scores is reported here. 
 
 
Results 
 
General 
No significant sex differences were observed 
for any of the measures, so the results were 
collapsed across gender. Parametric statistics are 
reported throughout, although there was some 
question as to whether the distribution of the 
divergent-thinking scores might be too skewed for 
this. Thus, analysis was also conducted with 
nonparametric statistics using rank scales, u tests, 
and Kendall's tau-b and partial tau. The same 
associations were significant as those yielded 
from parametric analysis. Again, to avoid re-
dundancies, it was thus decided to only report the 
parametric results. 
 
False-belief tasks. Thirty children (50.8%) 
failed and 29 children (49.2%) passed the Sally-
Anne task. The mermaid task was failed by 32 
participants (54.2%), whereas 19 children (32.2%) 
passed. Eight children (13.6%) did not give an 
answer to the question. The car-box task was the 
most difficult, with only 15 children (25.4%) 
answering the false-belief question correctly. 
Forty-three children (72.9%) failed, and 1 (1.7%) 
did not reply. Together the three tasks resulted in 
a composite measure (the criterion was passing at 
least two tasks) with about one third (20) 
classified as having and about two thirds (39) as 
not having false-belief understanding. The three 
tasks were significantly (p < ,005) intercorrelated 
with values of r = .37 (SA-Mermaid), r = .38 (SA-
Car), and r = .42 (Mermaid-Car). 
Divergent thinking. The mean fluency score 
was 16.44 (SD =10.41) items over the six 
questions. In the Uses subtask and in the Instances 
subtask 6.95 and 9.49 items were produced on 
average, respectively. The uniqueness scores for 
Uses (1.92, SD = 2.21) and Instances (2.20, SD= 
2.84) were quite similar and accumulated in the 
overall average uniqueness score of 4.12 (SD = 
4.14). 
 
BPVS and WPPSI-R BPVS scores were 
only available for 50 of the 59 participating 
children. The average raw score was 33.3 (SD = 
10.51). This converted into a verbal IQ average of 
96.22 (SD= 11.40). A very similar level of 
general ability resulted from the Geometric 
Design subtest of the WPPSI-R. The average 
nonverbal IQ was 9.76 (with 10 = IQ of 100; SD 
= 2.47). Overall, the sample seemed to be of 
average intelligence. The lower outliers were kept 
in the sample because (a) they did not perform 
badly on the  other tests and (b) standardization of 
the norms for a New Zealand sample were not 
available. 
Associations between the Measures 
Pearson correlation coefficients were 
calculated to assess the associations between the 
variables (see Table 1). 
 
 
False-belief understanding and divergent 
thinking. Correlations between the two divergent-
thinking measures and the false-belief tasks were 
strong and significant (see Table 1). The Sally-
Anne task (fluency: r =.57, p <.001; uniqueness: r 
=.57, p <.001) and car-box task (fluency: r = .39, 
p<.005; uniqueness: r=.40, p<.005) were 
significantly associated with divergent thinking, 
whereas the mermaid task was not (fluency: r =. 
14, p =.16; uniqueness: r =.22, p =.06). T tests 
confirmed that those children classified as having 
acquired false-belief understanding produced 
significantly more appropriate items (M= 23.15 
vs. 13.00; t(57) = 3.97, p <.001) and more unique 
items (M= 6.9 vs. 2.63; t(57) = 4.18, p <.001) 
than those children who failed to show evidence 
of understanding false beliefs. 
    One reason for the observed association could 
be the effect of mediating variables. Age and 
verbal and nonverbal intelligence were found to 
be correlated with both divergent-thinking and 
false-belief understanding (see Table 1). These 
variables might therefore be responsible for the 
observed association. In order to control for the 
effect of these variables, partial correlation 
coefficients were calculated. Table 2 shows that 
the association between false-belief understanding 
and both divergent-thinking scores survived 
partialling out BPVS scores, Geometric Design 
scores, and any combination of these covariates. In 
spite of the strong intercorrelations, the 
associations between false-belief understanding 
and divergent thinking were not caused by 
mediating effects of age or verbal or nonverbal 
general ability. 
 
Table 1. Pearson Correlation Coefficients for the Variables 
Variable Fluency Uniqueness Age BPVS WPPSI-R 
False Belief .47*** .49*** .46*** .44** .25* 
Fluency  .89*** .40** .29* .51*** 
Uniqueness   .34** .29* .38** 
Age    .54*** .52*** 
BPVS     .44** 
Note: BPVS = British Picture Vocabulary Scale (L. M. Dunn, Dunn, Whetton, & Pintilie, 1982); 
WPPSI-R = Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence-Revised (Wechsler, 1989). N= 50 
for correlations with BPVS and WPPSI-R; otherwise, N= 59. 
*p <.05. **p <.005. ***p <.001. 
Table 2. Association Between False-Belief Understanding and Both Divergent Thinking 
Measures (Fluency and Uniqueness) After Partialling out Age, BP VS, and Geometric De-
sign 
Controlled Variables df Fluency Uniqueness 
-  .47** .49** 
Age 56 .35* .39* 
BPVS 47 .43* .41* 
Geometric Design 47 .44* .43* 
Age and BPVS 46 .38* .40* 
Age and Geometric Design 46 .43 * .44* 
BPVS and Geometric Design 46 .44* .41* 
Age, BPVS, and Geometric Design 45 .43* .42* 
Note: BPVS = British Picture Vocabulary Scale (L. M. Dunn, Dunn, Whetton, & Pintilie, 1982); 
Geometric Design = Geometric Design subtask of the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of 
Intelligence-Revised (Wechsler, 1989). The partials involving ability scores were based on n = 50. *p < 
.005. **p < .001. 
The associations might nonetheless merely be 
artifacts reflecting a lack of task understanding in 
some children. Thus a reanalysis of the data 
included only participants whose task 
comprehension was evident through production of 
at least one appropriate item to every divergent-
thinking question. This criterion reduced the 
number of cases to 44. Yet the false-belief  
measure continued to be significantly associated 
with both fluency (r =.36, p<.01) and uniqueness 
(r=.36, p<.0l ) scores. T tests confirmed the 
significant difference between the groups: fluency, 
t(42) = 2.48, p <.0l; uniqueness , t(42) = 2.49, 
p<.01. Even when age, BPVS, and Geometric 
Design were partialled out of the correlation from 
this reduced sample, the associations remained 
significant. False-belief understanding continued to 
be correlated with fluency (r = .41, df=32, p<.01) 
and uniqueness (r = .35, df = 32, p<.05). 
 
Discussion 
 
    These results replicated with a bigger sample the 
earlier finding by Suddendorf and Fletcher-Flinn 
(1997). We found a significant association between 
theory of mind as measured by false-belief task 
performance and divergent thinking, both in 
quantity (fluency) and originality (uniqueness). The 
correlation was of similar strength (around r = .5) 
and also survived partialling out age and verbal 
intelligence as measured with the BPVS. Further, a 
nonverbal measure of intelligence, the Geometric 
Design subtest of the WPPSI-R (Wechsler, 1989), 
was added to our study. Neither controlling for 
nonverbal intelligence nor for any combination of 
covariates reduced the association between false-
belief understanding and divergent thinking below 
significance. 
This suggests that these variables are linked in 
other ways. However, simple correlational analysis 
cannot inform us of the nature of the association. 
Greater divergent-thinking skills might contribute 
to earlier development of a representational theory 
of mind, but it might also be that divergent thinking 
improves when false-belief tasks are passed. 
 
 
Study 2 
 
    To investigate the nature of the relation between 
false-belief understanding and divergent thinking 
further, children who failed all false-belief tasks 
were retested 3 months later. Longitudinal, rather 
than cross-sectional designs should be used to 
address questions of directionality, but retesting 
confronts the researcher with a choice between 
problems associated with employing the same tasks 
(learning effects) and problems associated with 
employing different tasks that are assumed to 
measure the same skill as the first (task-specific 
effects). We chose the former because learning 
opportunity would be the same for all participants, 
whereas new tasks might have differential effects 
on the children's performance. 
    Our first prediction was that children who passed 
the false-belief tasks at the second testing would do 
better on the divergent-thinking tasks than those 
who continued to fail. If this hypothesis were 
supported, this would essentially be a replication of 
the cross-sectional correlations reported in the first 
study. However, the retesting was done primarily 
to assess the direction of the associations. If 
divergent thinking reflects imaginative power and 
greater imaginative power facilitates the acquisition 
of a representational theory of mind (imaginative 
power hypothesis), then one would expect that 
higher divergent-thinking scores at the first testing 
are associated with better false-belief task 
performance at the second testing. However, if the 
associations are due to the emergence of underlying 
skills aiding both false-belief understanding and 
divergent thinking, then one would expect that 
those children who pass the false-belief tasks at the 
second testing should not have had significantly 
higher divergent-thinking scores at the first testing, 
but should significantly increase in their divergent-
thinking scores at the second testing. Indeed, we 
expected that intraindividual improvement in 
divergent thinking would be significantly greater in 
the children who pass false-belief tasks than in 
children who do not. 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
Twenty children from the previous study were 
asked to participate in this study. The criterion for 
selection was that the child did not pass any of the 
false-belief tasks in the original study. Seven girls 
and 13 boys participated. The average age was 3-11 
(SD = 5.82) at the time of the first measurement. 
Both verbal and nonverbal general ability for this 
group was about normal (BPVS: 94, SD = 10.18; 
WPPSI-R: 10.05, SD = 2.39). Note that a1120 
children had been tested on the BPVS and the 
Geometric Design tests at the first testing, so no 
raw score adjustments were necessary. 
 
Procedure 
 
The children were retested with the same tasks 
3 months after the first testing. A different 
experimenter did the testing. Although the 
experimenter was asked to adhere to the same 
procedure, differences-especially in regard to the 
probing and permissiveness in the divergent-
thinking task and in general rapport with each child 
were to be expected. However, these effects 
seemed preferable to the problems that would be 
created by using the same experimenter. 
"Blindness" toward the earlier performances of the 
children was regarded as of paramount importance 
for the validity of the results regarding the main 
predictions. To prevent any experimenter bias, the 
divergent-thinking task was administered prior to 
the false-belief tasks. 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Second Testing 
 
False-belief tasks. Three months after the 
initial testing, 40% (8 out of 20) of the children 
who initially failed all false-belief tasks in Study 1 
were categorized as having acquired an 
understanding of false beliefs (having passed a 
minimum of two tasks). The Sally-Anne task was 
passed by 11 children, and the car-box and the 
mermaid tasks were passed by 8 children each. The 
composite measure of false-belief understanding 
was associated with age. That is, those children 
who passed the tasks were significantly older (49.5 
vs. 45.1 months) than those who continued to fail 
them, t(18) = 1.75, p <.05. 
 
Divergent thinking. The children produced 
an average of 15.25 (SD = 8.11) appropriate items 
and an average of 6.2 (SD=4.74) unique items. 
Those children who had acquired false-belief 
understanding produced on average 21.13 items, 
whereas the other children only achieved 11.33 
items. A Levene's test (Levene, 1960) showed that 
the variance in the performance of the two groups 
on these tasks was unequal (F= 6.26, p < .05). The t 
test assuming unequal variances confirmed that the 
difference between the groups was significant, 
t(9.05) = 2.82, p <.05. Children with false-belief 
understanding also produced significantly more 
unique items (9.75 vs. 3.83) than those without, 
t(18) = 3.42, p <.005. This is also reflected in the 
significant correlations reported in Table 3. The 
first prediction was therefore confirmed for both 
divergent-thinking measures. 
 
Partial correlations. In order to control for 
the effect of age and general ability, partial 
correlation coefficients were calculated. False-
belief understanding and fluency scores continued 
to be significantly related, even when age (r =.54, 
df = 17,p <.01), BPVS scores (r =.52, df = 17, p 
<.05), or Geometric Design scores (r = .62, df = 17, 
p < .005) were partialled out. The association with 
the uniqueness scores proved equally robust. The 
partial correlations were r =.55 (df = 17,p <.01) 
when controlling for age, r=.55 (df= 17, p<.01) 
when controlling for BPVS, and r = .64 (df = 17, p 
<.005) when controlling for Geometric Design. 
Even when controlling for all three covariates, 
higher fluency (r =.46, df= 15, p<.05) and 
uniqueness scores (r= .48, df= 15, p <.05) remained 
significantly associated with understanding false 
beliefs. 
 
Comparing First and Second Testing 
 
To examine the direction of the relation 
between divergent-thinking scores and false-belief 
understanding, performance on both testings was 
compared. 
 
Divergent thinking. Three months later 
fluency scores increased from an average of 10.35 
to 15.25. Intraindividual analyses of children's 
patterns of response over time showed that 14 
children improved their performance, 1 remained 
constant, and 5 produced fewer items. Wilcoxon 
Matched-Pairs Signed Ranks test (Wilcoxon, 1949) 
confirmed the improvement (z = 2.6, p < .005). 
Uniqueness scores rose from 3.65 to 6.2. Twelve 
children improved, 5 worsened, and 3 tied. Again, 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed Ranks test 
confirmed the improvement (z = 2.14, p < .05). 
    The higher divergent-thinking scores of the 
children classified as understanding false beliefs 
might be due to them having higher divergent-
thinking scores at the first measure. In fact, these 
children had a higher original average of 11.87 
(fluency) and 4.37 (uniqueness) than the children 
who continued to fail false-belief tasks on the 
second testing (9.33 and 3.16, respectively), but 
these differences were not significant. In contrast to 
the prediction from the imaginative power 
hypothesis, diver gent-thinking scores at the first 
testing were not significantly correlated with false-
belief task performance 3 months later, but given 
the small sample size, one needs to be cautious in 
interpreting these negative findings. We decided to 
further investigate whether divergent-thinking skill 
at the first testing predicts false-belief 
understanding at the second testing by creating two 
same-sized groups based on the original divergent-
thinking scores (fluency < 11 vs. fluency > 10). 
There was no difference between the group of 
children with more than 10 items and those 
children having produced 10 items or less on 
understanding false beliefs 3 months later (40% of 
each group was classified as having false-belief 
understanding).  
This suggests that the significant association 
between false-belief understanding and divergent 
thinking at the second testing might instead be due 
to differential improvement in divergent thinking. 
Differential improvement over the 3 months can be 
tested by calculating separate t tests for matched 
samples of the groups. The improvement in 
children who continued to fail false-belief tasks 
was not significant. Fluency scores rose from 9.3 to 
 Table 3. Pearson Correlation Coefficient for the Variables 
Variable Fluency Uniqueness Age BPVS Geometric 
Design 
False Belief .61** .63** .38* .39* .16 
Fluency  .94*** .40* .45* -.01 
Uniqueness   .45* .46* .00 
Age    .25 .43* 
BPVS     .43* 
Note: N= 20. BPVS =British Picture Vocabulary Scale (L. M. Dunn, Dunn, Whetton, & Pintilie,1982); Geometric 
Design = Geometric Design subtask of the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence-Revised 
(Wechsler, 1989). 
*p <.05. **p <.005. ***p <.001.  
 
11.3 and uniqueness scores from 3.2 to 3.8. In 
contrast, the children who now passed false-belief 
tasks improved significantly on the fluency, from 
11.87 to 21.13; t(7) = 3.86,p <.005; and uniqueness 
scores, from 4.38 to 9.75; t(7) = 3.16,p <.01. 
To compare whether the improvements of the 
children who displayed false-belief understanding 
differs significantly from the improvements of the 
other children, new variables were created by 
subtracting the scores of the first from those of the 
second round of testing. The difference in fluency 
scores was significantly higher (i.e., greater 
improvement) for those who passed false-belief 
tasks than for those who failed, t(18) = 2.45, p 
<.05, with the former increasing the score by an 
average of 9.25 items and the latter by an average 
of only 2. Similarly, the individual improvement of 
uniqueness scores was significantly greater, t(18) = 
2.43,p <.05, for the children who displayed false-
belief understanding (improving by 5.38) than for 
those who did not (improving by 0.67). The 
improvement in fluency and uniqueness scores 
were significantly correlated with understanding 
false beliefs (r = .50; p < .05). 
Age, BPVS, and Geometric Design scores were 
not significantly related to the improvement 
variables. To exclude the possibility that these 
factors might nonetheless mediate the observed 
relation between false-belief understanding and 
divergent-thinking improvement, partial 
correlations were calculated. As can be seen from 
Table 4, the correlations remained significant, even 
when these possible mediating factors were 
controlled for. When controlling for the effect of 
Geometric Design scores, the correlation 
coefficient even increased. Altogether, then, the 
data supports the hypothesis that divergent-
thinking skill increases when children become able 
to understand false beliefs. 
 
General Discussion 
 
The first aim of this project was to try to replicate 
the earlier finding by Suddendorf and Fletcher-
Flinn (1997) that performance on false-belief tasks 
and divergent-thinking measures are positively 
correlated. Both the first and second studies found 
a significant association between false-belief tasks 
and both fluency and uniqueness scores. The 
strength of the correlation was similar to the earlier 
finding ranging from .47 to .63. Controlling for 
chronological age and BPVS scores, as in the 
earlier study, did not reduce the association below 
statistical significance. 
A second aim of the study was to improve on 
the measures previously employed by Suddendorf 
and Fletcher-Flinn (1997). We included two
 
 
Table 4. Correlations and Partial Correlations Between False-Belief Understanding and Intra-
Individual Improvement in Fluency (Dif-Fluency: Study 2 Fluency Scores Minus Study 1 Scores) 
and Uniqueness (Dif-Uniqueness: Study 2 Uniqueness Scores Minus Study 1 Uniqueness Scores) 
of the Divergent-Thinking Task 
Controlled Variable df Dif-Fluency Dif-Uniqueness 
  .50* .50* 
Age 17 .46* .43* 
BPVS 17 .44* .45* 
Geometric Design 17 .59*** .58** 
Age and BPVS 16 .42* .40* 
Age and Geometric Design 16 .53* .50* 
BPVS and Geometric Design 16 .51* .50* 
Age, BPVS, Geometric Design 15 .43* .41* 
Note: BPVS = British Picture Vocabulary Scale (L. M. Dunn, Dunn, Whetton, & Pintilie, 1982); Geometric 
Design = Geometric Design subtask of the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence-Revised 
(Wechsler, 1989). 
*p < .05. **p <.01. ***p < .005. 
 surprise tasks in addition to the Sally-Anne task to 
increase the generality of the false-belief measure. 
A problem with the divergent-thinking task could 
have been that younger children failed to 
comprehend what was required of them. We 
reexamined the data, including only children who 
showed adequate comprehension through appro-
priate answers to every item. The same associations 
were found to be significant. Finally, nonverbal 
intelligence was considered a plausible explanatory 
factor not controlled for in the previous study. A 
measure of nonverbal intelligence was therefore 
included, and neither controlling for this alone nor 
in combination with verbal intelligence and 
chronological age reduced the associations below 
significance. With chronological age and verbal 
and nonverbal mental age, a broad spectrum of 
general maturational or developmental 
improvements was covered. In the light of these 
precautions the associations appear to be robust. 
The third issue driving this study was whether a 
repeated measure 3 months later would illuminate 
questions regarding the direction of the relation 
under investigation. Earlier divergent-thinking 
scores did not predict children's performance on the 
false-belief tasks 3 months later. Although the 
results do not exclude the possibility that greater 
powers of imagination promote earlier acquisition 
of a representational theory of mind, they fail to 
support the possibility that this imaginative power 
hypothesis can explain the robust correlation 
between false-belief understanding and divergent 
thinking. Instead, passing the false-belief tasks 3 
months after originally failing them was associated 
with a significant intraindividual improvement in 
divergent thinking. The children who passed false-
belief tasks improved significantly more than those 
children who continued to fail. This differential 
improvement suggests that the two skills develop 
in tandem (although future studies might want to 
look at even shorter periods than 3 months to see 
whether one skill improves prior to the other). The 
correlations between false-belief understanding and 
intraindividual improvement scores on the 
divergent-thinking task were robust, surviving 
partialling out chronological age and measures of 
verbal and nonverbal ability. Taken together, the 
results support the claim that with passing false-
belief tasks, divergent-thinking skill increases. 
Interestingly, autistic children, who often fail 
theory-of-mind measures such as false-belief tasks 
(e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1989; Baron-Cohen et al., 
1985), have recently been reported to produce 
significantly fewer items than normal controls on a 
single task similar to the Uses test employed here 
(Scott & Baron-Cohen, 1996). However, Scott and 
Baron-Cohen (1996) did not find a significant 
difference between autistic children and a matched 
group of children with mental handicap (who 
generally pass false-belief tasks). This might be 
due to important differences in our tasks. Scott and 
Baron-Cohen's task presented the children with an 
actual brick when asking them "what can you do 
with a brick," and they set a time limit of only 2 
min for the answers. Individual differences, 
especially in regard to more novel ideas, show 
mainly in the later stages of the answer time, when 
the more straightforward answers have been 
exhausted (cf. Runco, 1992). Without the open-
ended nature of the divergent-thinking task, group 
differences might have been underestimated. The 
present results suggest that children without a 
representational theory of mind should do worse 
than controls on open-ended divergent-thinking 
tasks. 
Scott and Baron-Cohen (1996) claimed that in 
spite of the quantitative similarity between the 
mental handicap group and the autism group, there 
were qualitative differences in the answers. The 
autistic responses were more "direct" associations 
(e.g., build a house), whereas the clinical control 
group produced more "pretend" or "abstract" ideas. 
Indeed, none of the autistic responses was 
classified as pretend/abstract. Scott and Baron-
Cohen (1996) used this to support their claim that 
autistic children have problems imagining unreal 
things. However, an example of the purportedly 
pretend/abstract answers of the children with 
mental handicap was "use it to stand tapes on a tape 
stand." We fail to see the abstract or pretend nature 
of this response. Instead, we suggest that such a 
response is perhaps a more creative answer than 
"building a house" and is probably the result of a 
more divergent mental search beyond areas of 
directly activated mental content. In the light of the 
present results, this suggests that autistic children 
are impaired in generating divergent answers 
because they lack the facilitating effect of the skills 
that underlie a representational theory of mind. 
Because false-belief understanding is not 
obviously involved in the divergent-thinking task, 
and because the present results do not support the 
idea that the observed associations between false-
belief understanding and divergent thinking are 
solely due to increased imaginative powers 
promoting earlier development of a 
representational theory of mind, it is reasonable to 
assume that some common underlying skill 
enhances performance on both tasks. Executive 
functioning and representational improvements 
have been proposed to underlie 4-year-olds' 
capacity to pass standard theory-of-mind tasks. 
Although the present data cannot show what 
variable is responsible, it is important to consider 
how these purported improvements might affect 
divergent-thinking skill. 
Several authors have claimed that 
metacognitive skills are important for the process 
of determining whether potential solutions fulfill 
particular problem criteria (e.g., Ebert, 1994; 
Feldhusen, 1995; Suddendorf & Fletcher-Flinn, 
1997). When children pass false-belief tasks they 
are said to be capable of metarepresentation, or 
representing representations as representations 
(e.g., Perrier, 1991, 1995; Pylyshyn, 1978). What is 
crucial here, according to Perner (1991, 1995), is 
that the child now understands the difference 
between what something represents and how it 
represents it as being. This may also be important 
for divergent thinking. When the child has to 
produce different uses for, say, a newspaper, it may 
represent a newspaper (there is no newspaper 
perceptible) and represent it as being (a) something 
to read, (b) packaging, and (c) material for making 
a hat. The same object is represented in different 
ways, and whether these representations meet the 
problem criteria is assessed. 
With metarepresentation, the child is in a 
position to simultaneously entertain several 
conflicting representations of the same object or 
event (e.g., Flavell, 1993; Olson, 1993). But this 
ability is not necessarily required for children to 
produce appropriate answers to divergent-
thinking questions. Answers might not be 
conflicting, and they might be entertained one 
after the other rather than concurrently. Indeed, 
children who fail false-belief tasks are clearly 
capable of divergent thinking. However, for these 
children a salient idea might stay in the focus of 
attention and thus prevent them from entertaining 
more novel alternative solutions that conflict with 
it. When the child can entertain conflicting 
representations concurrently (i.e., when they can 
pass false-belief tasks), this inhibitory process 
can be overcome and divergent thinking is 
facilitated. This might be why children produce 
many more potential solutions (fluency) and 
generate more ideas that are in contrast to 
conventional uses (uniqueness) when they 
understand false beliefs. They may be better at 
scanning their own knowledge beyond the areas 
of immediately activated mental content. This 
may also allow them to better reconstruct the past 
and preconstruct the future (Suddendorf & 
Corballis, 1997). 
One might also interpret this as an increased 
ability to disengage from current mental content. 
Executive control or mental disengagement has 
been proposed to underlie the capacity to pass 
theory-of-mind tasks (e.g., Russei et al., 1994). 
One could, for example, argue that children need 
to disengage from their current model of reality 
in order to assume the false belief of another 
(e.g., regardless of where the object truly is, a 
person will search where she believes it is). Thus, 
the surge in divergent-thinking skill we observed 
in children who pass false-belief tasks might be 
caused by increased ease at disengaging from 
particular ways of looking at the object. 
The argument for an involvement of 
executive functions might also be made on the 
basis of flexibility in employing mental search 
rules. Although children begin to form categories 
in their second year, they initially have problems 
flexibly applying different rules. Zelazo and 
colleagues (e.g., Frye et al., 1995; Zelazo, Frye, 
& Rapus, 1996) found that 3-year-olds but not 5-
year-olds have problems changing the rules in 
card-sorting games. Children were asked to sort 
cards first according to, say, shape and 
subsequently according to color. The younger 
children had severe difficulty implementing a 
second rule and continued to sort the cards 
according to the first rule. What appears to be 
causing the problem is the necessity to engage 
and disengage the rules according to need. This 
capacity might also be important for divergent 
thinking. When we consider the cards as 
analogous to items represented in a semantic net, 
then flexible search of one's own mind according 
to different rules might demand similar 
disengagement capacities. In the divergent-
thinking task, one may first scan one's knowledge 
for red items and then for round items. Flexibly 
applying different rules may pose a problem for 
younger children's mental search for appropriate 
problem solutions. 
There are various ways in which improvements 
in both executive and representational skills might 
plausibly be linked to improvement in divergent 
thinking and theory of mind. These views might 
not be in conflict. Indeed, Suddendorf (1999) 
proposed that both skills might contribute unique 
variance to a host of new capacities maturing 
around age 4. The link between acquiring a 
representational theory of mind and divergent 
thinking might therefore be multileveled, involving 
the effects of metarepresentational thinking and 
increased executive control. 
The current data cannot be used to assess this 
proposal. They do, however, strongly suggest that 
there is an underlying connection and that standard 
false-belief tasks are markers of more general 
cognitive advances. In this way, the data speak in 
favor of the traditional view of theory-of-mind 
development, which holds that passing standard 
theory-of-mind tasks reflects fundamental 
cognitive changes (e.g., Flavell, 1993; Olson, 1993; 
Perner, 1991). With development of a represen-
tational theory of mind, children not only gain in 
knowing about other minds but also in using their 
own minds. 
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